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STUDENT COMMENT
JURISDICTION OVER NON-RESIDENT MANUFACTURERS
IN NEW YORK: THE LONG-ARM AMPUTATED
As a result of a study and recommendation by the New York Advisory
Committee on Practice and Procedure,' the New York legislature, in 1962,
passed CPLR 302—a single-act statute? Modeled after the Illinois single-act
statute,3 the New York law was designed to take advantage of the constitu-
tional power of the state of New York to subject non-residents to personal
jurisdiction "when they commit acts within the state." 4
Recently, the New York Court of Appeals rendered its initial appraisal
of the scope of this statute. 5 It is the purpose of this note to set forth these
limitations, and to examine them in relation to those imposed on the single-
act statutes of other states.
The states, suffering under the handicap of Pennoyer v. Neff and similar
early decisions, 5 and the restriction that in personam jurisdiction be limited
by the state's physical power over the defendant, 7 had found it exceedingly
difficult to protect the interest of their citizens in an increasingly mobile
economy. To overcome these limitations, there evolved a number of fictive
devices upon which the states relied in obtaining jurisdiction over non-resi-
dents!' Based on the concept that a corporation is a creature of the state, and
1 N.Y. Advisory Comm. Rep., N.Y. Legislative Doc. No. 13, at 37-41 (1958).
2 N.Y. Civ. Prac. Laws & Rules § 302 (1963):
PERSONAL JURISDICTION BY ACTS OF NON-DOMICILIARIES.
a. Acts which are the basis of jurisdiction. A court may exercise personal
jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary, or his executor or administrator, as to a
cause of action arising from any of the acts enumerated in this section, in the
same manner as if he were a domiciliary of the state, if, in person or through an
agent, he:
1. transacts any business within the state; or
2. commits a tortious act within the state, except as to a cause of action for
defamation of character arising from the act; or
3. owns, uses or possesses any real property situated within the state.
3 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 110, § 17 (1956).
4 N.Y. Advisory Comm. Rep., supra note 1, at 39, As will be noted, there is even
some disagreement as to the meaning of these words. Infra pp. 139-42.
5
 Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co., v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d 443, 209
N.E.2d 68, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1965). Actually, in one decision, the court of appeals also
disposed of two ether cases: Feathers v. McLucas and Singer v. Walker.
6 See, e.g., Riverside & Dan River Cotton Mills v. Menefee, 237 U.S. 189 (1915);
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). See also Developments in the Law, State Court
Jurisdiction, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 909 (1960).
7 See McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917).
8
 In the period between Pennoyer v. Neff, supra note 6, and International Shoe v.
Washington, 326 U.5.310 (1945), many of these fictions were adopted and later abandoned,
or left to wither by the Supreme Court. See generally, Kurland, The Supreme Court, the
Due Process Clause, and the In Personam Jurisdiction of the State Courts, 25 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 569 (1958).
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that a.foreign corporation cannot transact any business within a state without
the state's permission, the states developed the "consent" theory: that the
price for the state's permission could be the corporation's consent to be sued
in the state's courts.° Similarly, under the "presence" theory, it was argued
that a corporation was amenable to state jurisdiction if it was doing business
within the state such as to warrant the inference that it was "present" there."
The "doing business" . theory allowed jurisdiction when by application of
either the "consent" or "presence" theories, a corporation could be said to be
"doing business" within the state.".
The single-act statutes originally resulted from the inability of the physi-
cal power standard to supply the states with a basis for providing a forum for
residents in actions against non-residents in certain situations, the most obvious
of which was the case of the non-resident tortfeasor (more particularly, the
motorist) who commits a tort and leaves the state before he can be served with
process. Thus, the earliest single-act statutes were the "non-resident motorist
statutes,”" which were subsequently held valid by the Supreme Court in Hess
9 See Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404 (1855). The "con-
sent" was said to be limited to ". . litigation arising out of its transactions in the state."
St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350, 356 {1882).
to Philadelphia & Reading Ry, v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264, 265 (1917).
11 The cases tended to analyze given fact situations to determine whether by engaging
in certain activities the foreign corporation was or was not "doing' business." The concept
itself was never really defined. See Kurland, supra note 8, at 584-86.
In 1945, the Supreme Court, in the famous case of International Shoe Co. v. Wash-
ington, supra note 8, decided to call a halt to this reliance on fiction. In sustaining the
validity of a Washington in personam judgment over a non-resident corporate defendant,
the Court there said:
Wine process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment
in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have cer-
tain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not
offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."
Id, at 316. The Court pointed out that since a corporation's presence can only be mani-
fested by the activities of its agents, the term "presence" is only used to symbolize those
activities of its agents within the state which would be necessary to meet the demands of
due process. The Court also noted that different results would follow the corporation's
casual or isolated presence than would follow continuous presence.
The Court in International Shoe did little to establish or define the new concept of
"minimum contacts." Further clarification came with McGee v. International Life Ins.
Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957), where the Court declared: "It is sufficient for purposes of due
process that the suit was based on a contract which had substantial connection with that
state." (Emphasis added.) Id. at 223. See also Perkins v. Benguet Consol, Mining Co.,
342 U.S. 437 (1952); Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950); Kurland,
supra note 8, at 586-624.
Limitations were finally drawn in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958). Recog-
nizing the evolution of a more flexible standard of requirements, the Court said that this
still did not indicate an end to all such restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of the state
courts. The Court did say, however, that ". . . [I]t is essential in each case that there
be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conduct-
ing activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its
laws." (Emphasis added.) Id. at 253.
12
 The current statutes are collected at Note, Nonresident Motorist Statutes—Their
Current Scope, 44 Iowa L. Rev. 384 n.1 (1959).
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v. Pawloski'3 as a proper exercise of the police power of the state over dan-
gerous instrumentalities, and on the additional basis of implied consent.
Then in 1935, the validity of similar statutes aimed at the non-resident
corporate defendant was established by Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Good-
man," when the Supreme Court upheld jurisdiction founded on an Iowa
statute" which provided for service of process on an agent of a non-resident
corporation (in that case, a securities dealer) doing business in Iowa in a cause
of action resulting from that business. The Court argued that Iowa treated
the business of dealing in securities as exceptional in nature and subjected it
to special regulation. Therefore, analogizing to the non-resident motorist
statutes, since the state could regulate the activity, it could make consent to
be sued in the state courts a condition for engaging in that activity in the
state. In fact, then, the Iowa statute went no further than the (already ap-
proved) non-resident motorist statutes."
The general acceptance of the single-act statutes 17 before the decision of
International Shoe Co. v. Washington's may well have played a large part
in that decision. In any event, International Shoe and the emergence of the
"minimum contacts" standard led to the proliferation of the state single-act
statutes, and an expansion of their scope and application." These statutes
generally base jurisdiction on a single contract 2" or a single tortious act, 2 ' al-
though in the latter case there is a division between statutes calling for the
commission within the state of "a tortious act" 22 and those calling for the
commission of "a tort, in whole or in part,"n a distinction which some courts
seem to find significant.
II
In 1962, New York joined the list of states which had single-act statutes
with the passage of CPLR 302. Clearly the statute was intended to broaden
the jurisdiction of the New York courts—but the early legislative com-
mentators could not agree how far. While the Advisory Committee said only
that the statute was designed to "take advantage of [the state's] constitu-
13 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
14 294 U.S. 623 (1935).
19 Iowa Code § 11079 (1931) (now, Iowa Rules of Civ. Proc. 56(f), (g) (1951)):
When a corporation, company, or individual has, for the transaction of any busi-
ness, an office or agency in any county other than that in which the principal
resides, service may be made on any agent or clerk employed in such office or
agency, in all actions growing out of or connected with the business of that
office or agency.
19 Henry L. Doherty & Co. v Goodman, supra note 14, at 628.
17 Developments in the Law, State Court jurisdiction, supra note 6, at 998-1000.
18 Supra note 11.
19 For a partial listing, see Restatement (Second), Conflict of Laws § 84, Reporter's
Note (Tent. Draft No. 3, April 19, 1956).
10 See, e.g., Md. Ann. Code art. 23, § 92(d) (1957); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 262.05(5)
(1965).
21 See, e.g., Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 110, § 17(1)(6) (1956); Wis, Stat. Ann. § 262.05(5)
(1965).
22 See, e.g., Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 110, § 17(1) (b) (1956); N.Y. Civ. Prac. Laws & Rules
§ 302 (a) 2 (1963) .
23 See, e.g., Minn. Stat. § 303.13(3) (1961); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 855 (1958).
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tional power under the leading case of [International Shoe ] ,”24 McLaughlin's
Practice Commentary to CPLR 302 says: "With the enactment of this statute,
New York has decided to exploit the fullest jurisdictional potential permis-
sible under federal constitutional restraints."" On the other hand, Professor
Weinstein, in his commentary on the new New York civil procedure, stated
that the Advisory Committee's notes did not adopt the position that New
York pursue its jurisdictional power to the extent done by Illinois under its
substantially identical statute." This, then, was the confused legislative legacy
devised to the lower New York courts. Their decisions, in interpreting the
scope and power of CPLR 302, were its echo.
a. "Transacts any Business within the State." 27—Clearly the require-
ment of transaction of any business within the state demands a great deal
less contact than what had been necessary under the old "doing business"
standard. In Patrick Ellam, Inc. v. Nieves,28
 it was determined that the
making of a single contract within the state by a non-resident "satisfies the
minimum contract [sic] contemplated by the legislature by the enactment of
Section 302 (a) of the Civil Practice Law and RuIes," 2° irrespective of where
the breach may have occurred. 3° Although the actual making of the contract
within the state was held sufficient contact to be "a transaction of business" in
Ellam, negotiations and discussions in New York prior to the signing of a
contract in North Carolina were not sufficient in Irgang v. Pelton & Crane
Co 31
 However, execution of the contract plus some other activity within the
state was sufficient contact to be a "transaction of business within the state." 32
24 N.Y. Advisory Comm. Rep., supra note 1, at 39.
23
 McLaughlin, Practice Commentary 428 (7B McKinney's Consol. Laws of N.Y.
(1963)).
23
 Weinstein posited the theory that the New York statute
"is designed to take advantage of the constitutional power of the state of
Now York to subject non-residents to personal jurisdiction, when they commit
acts within the state, . ." This is not to say that CPLR 301 and 302 when read
together do not permit the courts to extend jurisdiction to its outer limits. . . .
The advisory committee's intention seems to have been to compel the courts to
break free from past restrictive interpretations of their powers, but it does permit
them to draw a line that veers in from place to place from due process
boundaries.
1 Weinstein, Korn & Miller, New York Civil Practice,
	 302.01, at 3-29 (1963).
27
 CPLR 302(a) I. See Thornton, First Judicial Interpretations of the New York
Single Act Statute, 30 Brooklyn L. Rev. 285, 288-90 (1964).
28 41 Misc. 2d 186, .245 N.Y.S.2d 545 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
20 Id. at 188, 245 N.Y.S.2d at 547. The court cited with approval McLaughlin's
Practice Commentary, supra note 25.
" "While it may be argued that the breach of the contract occurred . . . outside the
state of New York, the Court considers the making of the contract in New York and the
arising of a cause of action out of such a contract as sufficient to validate the service of
process effected herein." Patrick Ellam, Inc. v. Nieves, supra note 28, at 188.
31
 42 Misc. 2d 70, 247 N.Y.S.2d 743 (Sup. Ct. 1964). See also Grobark v. Addo
Machine Co., 16 Ill. 2d 426, 158 N.E.2d 73 (1959). But see National Gas Appliance Corp.
v. A B Electrolux, 270 F.2d 472 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 959 (1960).
32
 Thus the signing of a contract to buy stock and the transfer of stock in New York
was sufficient contact to constitute a transaction of business within the state in Steele v.
De Leeuw, 40 Misc. 2d 807, 244 N.Y.S.2d 97 (Sup. Ct. 1963), and indeed, in Elkan v. Hind-
man Agency, Inc., 46 Misc. 2d 403, 259 N.Y.S.2d 563 (Dist. Ct. 1965), it was determined
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In line with the limitation of Hanson v. Denckla,33 the cases indicated that
the requirement of transaction of any business within the state was not met
unless the defendant (and not the plaintiff) performed an act while present
in the state. 34 There are, however, recurrent in the opinions, statements and
intimations that the courts were merely trying to interpret CPLR 302 (a)1,
and not to define the due process limit of the statute. The court in Irgang v.
Pelt on & Crane Co., speaks to this effect: "[W] e must distinguish between
what the United States Supreme Court says a State may legislate and what a
State does do in legislating its jurisdiction over nondomiciliary defendants." 35
b. "Commits a Tortious Act within the State.""—The problem of in-
terpreting the "tortious act" section of the statute is a great deal more com-
plicated, and the results of the lower New York courts in doing so were
correspondingly less satisfactory in establishing a workable standard.
The problem of jurisdiction over the non-resident tortfeasor is twofold.
There is really little difficulty in sustaining jurisdiction over a non-resident
tortfeasor under the usual single-act statute where the commission of the tort
in one state results in the occurrence of damage in that same state." The more
difficult problem occurs, however, when an out-of-state tortious act or failure
to act results in damage in the forum state.
CPLR 302(a)2, as previously stated, was patterned after the Illinois
provision. At the time the New York statute was enacted, and after no little
uncertainty, the Illinois courts had decided and the federal courts reluctantly
conceded" that the Illinois statute" would sustain jurisdiction in the case of
an out-of-state act or omission producing an injury within the forum state.
In Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.," the non-resident
defendant, an Ohio manufacturer, made the valve in question, which was in-
corporated into a heater by a Pennsylvania manufacturer; the heater was
later sold to the plaintiff, a resident of Illinois, where the allegedly defective
that delivery in the state of an insurance contract to be performed in New York by a Cali-
fornia corporation not licensed to do business in New York was, when added to the fact
that the defendant had solicited the plaintiff's business in New York, sufficient "transaction
of business" to justify the exercise of jurisdiction of New York courts over a cause of
action arising from that contract. See also Iroquois Gas Corp. v. Collins, 42 Misc. 2d 632,
248 N.Y,S.2d 494 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
33 Hanson v. Denckla, supra note 11. ".. • pit is essential in each case that there be
some act by which the defendant purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting
activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws."
Id. at 253.
34 Thornton, supra note 27, at 288. See Schreder v. Loomis, 46 Misc. 2d 184, 259
N.Y.S.2d 42 (Sup. Ct. 1965); see also Old Westbury Golf & Country Club, Inc. v.
Mitchell, 44 Misc. 2d 687, 254 N.Y.S.2d 679 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
35 Supra note 31, at 74, 247 N.Y.S.2d at 748.
38 CPLR 302(a)2. See Thornton, supra note 27, at 291-94.
37 See Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp., 116 Vt. 569, 80 A.2d 664 (1951).
38 See McMahon v. Boeing Airplane Co., 199 F. Supp. 908-09 (N.D. Ill. 1961).
3D The corresponding section of the Illinois Code provides for jurisdiction over non-
resident defendants in any cause of action arising from "the commission of a tortious act
within this state." Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 110, § 17(1)(14 (1961). The history of the judicial
struggle for a statutory interpretation can be found in Currie, The Growth of the Long
Arm: Eight Years of Extended Jurisdiction in Illinois, 1963 U. Ill. L.F. 533.
40 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
•
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valve caused the heater to explode, injuring the plaintiff. The Illinois Supreme
Court determined that, in accordance with the traditional choice of law test,
a "tortious act" had been committed "in the State" because the injury had
occurred there.4 ' The court found a legislative intent that the scope of the
statute be ". . the extent permitted by the due process clause." 42 Assuming
that the Ohio manufacturer enjoyed an Illinois market for his product, de-
spite the fact that the record failed to show whether the defendant had done
any other business in Illinois either directly or indirectly," the court con-
cluded: "As a general proposition, if a corporation elects to sell its product
for ultimate use in another state, it is not unjust to hold it answerable there for
any damage caused by defects in those products."'" It was irrelevant that
the Ohio manufacturer had not sold the valve in question directly in Illinois."
In Feathers v. McLucas," the supreme court refused to find that Gray
set the scope of CPLR 302 (a) 2, arguing that the statutory language "commits
a tortious act" was not synonymous with the language "commits a tortious
injury."47 The special term took the opposite approach in Fornabaio v.
Swissair Trans p. Co., 48 sustaining jurisdiction over a Delaware corporation
which had sold equipment it had manufactured to Westinghouse who incor-
porated it into its product which was then shipped to Swissair, the plaintiff's
employer, in New York where the plaintiff was injured. The court cited with
approval the statement in Gray that negligence in manufacturing cannot be
separated from the resulting injury," but was also quick to point out that the
defendant (S. & C. Electric Co.) was engaging in other contacts in New
York."
The Fornabaio approach was typical of the New York cases that followed
the Gray case, as the lower New York courts continued to seek some other
contact in the state in addition to the out-of-state negligence.
The courts devised various approaches in finding this additional contact.
In one instance, a lower court found more than one section of 302 which
would support jurisdiction. 81 In other cases the courts assumed, as in Gray,
41 Id. at 435, 176 N.E.2d at 762-63 (citing Restatement (Second); Conflict of Laws
§ 377 (1958)).
42 Id. at 436, 176 N.E.2d at 763. See Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673
(1957).
43 Id. at 438, 176 N.E.2d at 764.
44 Id. at 442, 176 N.E.2d at 766.
43 "It should not matter that the purchase was made from an independent middleman
or that someone other than the defendant shipped the product into this State," Ibid.
The Illinois federal courts had previously decided that Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 110,
§ 17(1)(b) (1961) did not grant jurisdiction to the Illinois courts in such a situation.
Hellriegal v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 157 F. Supp. 718 (N.D. III. 1957). They later reversed
themselves, however, and followed the Gray decision, McMahon v. Boeing Airplane Co.,
supra note 38; Anderson v. Pcnncraft Tool Co., 200 F. Supp. 145 (N.D. III. 1961).
40 41 Misc. 2d 498, 245 N.Y.S.2d 282 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
47 Id. at 504, 245 N.Y.S.2d at 287.
48 42 Misc. 2d 182, 247 N.Y.S.2d 203 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
43 Id. at 183, 247 N.Y.S.2d at 204-05.
30
 "Here, defendant's products are used' and consumed in this state in sufficient
quantity and this defendant knew that its product was being shipped to New York for
use therein." Id, at 183, 247 N.Y.S.2d at 205.
37
 See Moss v. Frost Hempstead Corp., 43 Misc. 2d 357, 251 N.Y.S.2d 194 (Sup. Ct.
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that the non-resident defendant knew or should have known that his product
would be used in New York, or that there was a substantial New York
market for his product. In Johnson v. Equitable Life Assur..Soc'y, 52 the de-
fendant, a Michigan manufacturer, produced a component which was incor-
porated into a window washing scaffold by a New Jersey manufacturer. The
scaffold was installed at Equitable's building in New York City, where, due to
an alleged defect in the component, the scaffold malfunctioned, causing the
death of the plaintiffs' decedents. The court made the same assumption that
had been made in Gray, that there was a large New York market for the
defendant's product, and that the defendant should have assumed the likeli-
hood that New York would be the ultimate market." In affirming per curiam,
the appellate division relied on the "other contacts" within the state as the
basis of jurisdiction. Noting the substantial price of the component manu-
factured by the Michigan defendant and the fact that a number of identical
components had been purchased by the New Jersey manufacturer for use in
scaffolds installed in New York City, the court concluded:
This was known to Michigan Tool, which, in connection with the
sale and installation of the completed products had occasion to in-
spect at least one of the installations in New York City, albeit not
the one involved in this case. These sales and services, even if indi-
rect because of the intervention of the New Jersey assembler, amount
to substantial contacts satisfying constitutional standards. 54
The same result was reached in Newman v. Nathen55 where, on facts
similar to those of Gray, the court itself raised the relevancy of inquiring
whether the scope of the New York statute was intended to be as broad as
the application of the Illinois statute as interpreted by Gray, ". . . especially
in the case of manufacturer's liability." 55 Acknowledging the holding of Gray,
the court distinguished the cases in which the manufacturer shipped or sold
the product in New York from those in which the product, without the knowl-
edge or intent of the manufacturer, eventually came to rest in the state," and
ultimately held that the non-domiciliary manufacturer would be amenable to
New York personal jurisdiction if there were a reasonably anticipated sale
in New York of the specific product which caused the injury."' Therefore,
again reluctant to base jurisdiction under CPLR 302 (a )2 on an out-of-state
negligence—local injury theory, the court stressed, and immediately found
compliance with, the additional factor of an anticipated contact.
1964) where the court determined that the "case would seem to come well within CPLR
§ 302(a)1, and 2 in that the cause of action arises from both the transaction of business
within the State and the commission of a tortious act therein." Id. at 358, 251 N.Y.S.2d
at 195.
52 43 Misc. 2d 850, 252 N.Y.S.2d 477 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
53 Id. at 851, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 478.
54 Johnson v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 22 App. Div. 2d 138, 140, 254 N.Y.S.2d
258, 260 (1964).
55 46 Misc. 2d 407, 259 N.Y.S.2d 637 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
55 Id. at 409, 259 N.Y.S.2d at 639.
57 Id. at 410, 259 N.Y.S.2d at 640-41.
5a Ibid.
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In Platt Corp. v. Platt,59 the supreme court was again reluctant to base
jurisdiction solely on the out-of-state negligence—local injury theory. The
court sustained jurisdiction under CPLR 302 over non-resident directors in
an action based on their failure to attend directors' meetings in New York.
First holding that this failure to act was a tort within the purview of the
statute, the court reasoned that since the defendants' duty was to go to New
York and participate in the corporate affairs, their failure to do so (an out-
of-state non-feasance) was a breach of duty in New York (a local injury),
and therefore, citing Gray, since the injury was local, the ". . . defendants'
`tortious acts' were committed in New York, where the alleged injuries caused
by their 'omissions' were suffered."°° By concluding that the neglect of duty
was at the place where the duty arose, the court established that the "tortious
acts" were local; thus it was spared the problem of having to face the issue
of Gray—whether jurisdiction can be sustained under the single-act statute
when an out-of-state tortious activity results in a local injury.
Clearly the interpretations of the lower New York courts had failed to
define workable standards, and the actual scope of the statute's grant of
jurisdiction remained unsettled until the recent decisions of the New York
Court of Appeals.
III
Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc. 01 represents
the first interpretation by the New York Court of Appeals of CPLR 302(a)1,
2. The single decision disposes of three cases, all of which arose under the
statute.
a. Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, inc.—Plain-
tiff, a New York corporation, sought to recover some $476,000 in damages
from the defendant, a Delaware corporation doing business in Chicago, for
an alleged breach of warranty of the defendant's contract to manufacture and
install certain machines in the plaintiff's plant at Lynbrook, Long Island.
During the negotiation period, the defendant mailed its contract proposals
to the plaintiff in New York and sent its officers there. Although the purchase
order was executed in Illinois, the order recited that it was a contract made
in New York and governed by the laws thereof.°2 After further negotiations
both in New York and Illinois a supplementary agreement was signed in
March 1963 by plaintiff in New York after it had been signed by the de-
fendant in Illinois. This agreement provided, among other things, that deliv-
ery of the machines did not constitute acceptance, and that the machines
would be accepted only after they had met certain tests. The machines were
shipped f.o.b. Chicago in April 1963, and from April until June, two of the
defendant's engineers were at the plaintiff's plant supervising installation.
After acceptance, the alleged defects were discovered and this action was
commenced. The defendant's motion to dismiss was denied by the special
term; the appellate division affirmed unanimously.° 3
80
 42 Misc. 2d 640, 249 N.Y.S.2d 1 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
60 Id. at 646, 249 N.Y.S.2d at 8.
61
 15 N.Y.2d 443, 209 N.E.2d 68, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1965).
62 Id. at 455, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 17.
68
 21 App. Div. 2d 474, 251 N.Y.S.2d 740 (1964).
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HELD: Defendant's activities in the state prior to and subsequent to
the actual execution of the contract are sufficient to meet the statutory re-
quirement of transaction of any business even if the contract was made else-
where.
In Daveny v. Rheem Mfg. Co., a recent Second Circuit decision con-
cerned with the Vermont single-act statute, Judge Clark (in dictum) con-
cisely stated the problem: "It is impossible to imagine a case arising from a
contract made by a foreign corporation 'with a resident of Vermont .
where contacts with Vermont would not suffice to sustain jurisdiction."'"
The difficulty with Longines-Wittnauer and that which distinguishes it from
Daveny and the other cases decided under CPLR 302(a)1 is that the court
had to determine whether contacts other than actual execution of the contract
in the state would be sufficient to sustain jurisdiction under the statute, and,
if so, whether the defendant's contacts were sufficient.
The court, noting that the legislature did not choose the most precise
language available, refused to read "transacts any business within the state"
to require that the contract be made in the state, or performed in the state. 05
Therefore, even if the last act of execution of the contract were elsewhere,
jurisdiction could still be obtained under CPLR 302(a)1."
The court then considered whether the defendant's contacts with New
York in the case were sufficient to be called a "transaction of business" under
the statute. The court considered the defendant's contacts with the state re-
garding the contract as a totality.
We need not determine whether any one of the foregoing activities
would in and of itself, suffice to meet the statutory standard; in com-
bination they more than meet that standard. And merely to list the
activities in which the appellant engaged in this State answers any
constitutional objection which might be raised against requiring the
appellant to make its defense in our courts."
In a leading case, Campania De Astral, S. A. v. Boston Metals Co.,° 8 the
Court of Appeals of Maryland, faced with a similar fact situation, considered
the defendant's activities within the state in their totality, rather than in-
dividually, in determining the defendant's contact as sufficient to sustain the
constitutionality of Maryland jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant
under the Maryland statute." Indeed, where the non-resident defendant's
64
 Daveny v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 319 F.2d 124, 128 (2d Cir. 1963).
65 See statutes cited in Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc.,
supra note 61, at 456, 209 N.E.2d at 75, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 18.
66 The court then concluded that the defendant's activities within the state clearly
showed a purposeful attempt to avail itself of the New York market. Id. at 458, 209
N.E,2d at 75, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 19.
67
 Ibid.
68 205 Md. 237, 107 A.2d 357, 108 A.2d 372 (1954) (dissent), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 943
(1955).
69
 The Maryland statute granted jurisdiction over foreign corporations in ". . any
cause of action arising out of a contract made within this State or liability incurred for
acts done within this State, whether or not such foreign corporation is doing business in
this State." Md. Ann. Code art. 23, § 88(d) (1951).
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actions within the state in their totality are sufficient to meet the "minimum
contacts" standard, there would seem to be no reason for determining whether
any one transaction would be adequate to satisfy the standard. That standard
would in fact contemplate a pattern of activity rather than individual acts. 7°
In summary, the court in Longines-Wittnauer, in interpreting the legis-
lative intent, concluded that ". . . the statutory test may be satisfied by a
showing of other purposeful acts performed by the appellant in this State in
relation to the contract, albeit preliminary or subsequent to its execution."'"
This interpretation, based as it is on the facts of Longines-Wittnauer, would
seem to be well within the due process limitations as established by Interna-
tional Shoe, McGee, and Hanson v. Denckla."
b. Feathers v. McLucas.—Traveling through upstate New York while
en route from Pennsylvania to Vermont, a tractor-drawn tank containing
liquified propane gas exploded, causing serious personal injuries and property
damage to the plaintiffs, who sued to recover for this damage. The tank was
manufactured in Kansas by the defendant Darby, a Kansas corporation,
under a contract with Butler Manufacturing Company, a Missouri corpora-
tion, allegedly with the knowledge that the latter would mount it on a wheel-
base and sell it to E. Brooke Matlock, a Pennsylvania corporation and inter-
state carrier licensed to operate in several states including New York.
HELD: Jurisdiction over the defendant Darby Corporation is improper
because CPLR 302 (a) 2 extends jurisdiction only to cases where a tortious
act is committed within the state by a nondomiciliary; the commission of a
tortious act outside the state which results in an injury within the state is not
equivalent to the commission of a tortious act within the state.
The appellate division, in reversing the special term's dismissal of the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction," had stated that ". . . in expanding the
State's in personam jurisdiction over nondomiciliaries the Legislature did not
intend to separate foreign wrongful acts from resulting forum consequences
and that the acts complained of here can be said to have been committed in
this State."74 The record, according to the appellate division, showed that
Darby knew the tank had been constructed for the ultimate Pennsylvania
7° See also S. Howes Co. v. W. P. Milling Co., 277 P.2d 655 (Okla. 1954), appeal
dismissed, 348 U.S. 983 (1955).
71
 Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., supra note 61, at 457,
209 N.E.2d at 75, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 18. See the cases cited, id. at 457 n.5, 209 N.E.2d at 75
n.5, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 18 n.5. It should also be noted that the Advisory Committee report
avoids language that would require an execution of the contract in the state. The language
of the report is in terms of commission of "acts within the state" or "defendant's trans-
action of business within the state." N.Y. Advisory Comm. Rep., N.Y. Legislative Doc.
No. 13, at 39 (1958).
72
 The constitutionality of a statute granting jurisdiction over a non-resident who
"transacts any business within the state" regardless of where the contract may be exe-
cuted is established. The Illinois law upon which CPLR 302 is based was judged not
violative of the due process clause. National Gas Appliance Corp. v. A B Electrolux, supra
note 31. See also Bluff Creek Oil Co. v. Green, 257 F.2d 83 (5th Cir. 1958),
73
 Feathers v. McLucas, 21 App. Div. 2d 558, 251 N.Y.S.2d 548 (1964).
74
 Id. at 559, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 550, citing Restatement (Second), Conflict of Laws
§§ 84, 91a (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1956) and Conklin v. Canadian-Colonial Airways, 226
N.Y. 244, 194 N.E. 692 (1935).
144
STUDENT COMMENT
user, and was intended for use in interstate commerce; the court concluded
that Darby could reasonably have foreseen that its negligence might well have
consequences in New York.75
The court of appeals, however, concerned itself strictly with the statute's
scope. "The language of [CPLR 302(a)2]—conferring personal jurisdiction
over the non-domiciliary 'if . . . he . . . commits a tortious act within the
state'—is too plain and precise to permit it to be read, as has the appellate
division, as if it were synonymous with 'commits a tortious act without the
state which causes injury within the state.' "76 The express design of the
statute and the draftsmen, reasoned the court, was to supply "jurisdiction
over a non-domiciliary whose act in the state gives rise to a cause of action"
and "to subject non-residents to personal jurisdiction when they commit acts
within the state."77
 Discussing Gray, the court found that decision to exceed
the bounds of sound statutory construction," and that the reliance of the
appellate division on that case had been misplaced. The court concluded
that the New York legislature had no intention of granting as complete juris-
diction in CPLR 302 (a) 2 as the Gray decision had attributed to the Illinois
act.
In a concurring opinion, Judge Van Voorhis agreed that CPLR 302 (a) 2
will not confer jurisdiction in this case. However, he stated his belief that the
interpretation of the statute made by the majority approached the permissible
limit under the due process clause, thus disagreeing with the majority's con-
clusion that the statute was not intended to expand the New York courts'
jurisdiction to the limit permitted by the due process clause. 7 ')
Chief Judge Desmond, dissenting, would affirm Feathers v. McLucas.
The construction of the majority "restrict[sl the statutory language . • . so
narrowly as to defeat the apparent legislative purpose and deprive our citizens
of the intended benefits of the statutory plan."'"
c. Singer v. Walker.—Plaintiff, Michael Singer, a minor, sued for dam-
ages sustained by him when a geologist's hammer be was using broke and a
chip penetrated his eye while he was on a field trip in Connecticut. The ham-
mer was manufactured by the defendant, Estwing Manufacturing Company
of Illinois, and bore the label, "Unbreakable Tools. Estwing Mfg. Co." It was
shipped by Estwing f.o.b. Illinois to the defendant Walker, a New York
dealer in geological supplies, in response to the latter's order, and was pur-
chased from Walker by Michael's aunt, who presented it to the boy.
HELD: CPLR 302(a)1 is not limited to actions in contract, but applies
also to actions in tort based on the defendant's transaction of business within
the state; defendant's substantial shipment of its product into New York
due to solicitation of a local manufacturer's representative is sufficient contact
to warrant jurisdiction based on CPLR 302 (a)1.
75 Feathers v. McLucas, supra note 73, at 560, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 551.
70 Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., supra note 61, at 460,
209 N.E.2d at 77, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 21.
77 N.Y. Advisory Comm. Rep., supra note 71, at 37, 39.
78
 Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., supra note 61, at 463,
209 N.E.2d at 79, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 23.
78
 Id. at 467-68, 209 N.E.2d at 82, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 27.
88
 Id. at 472, 209 N.E.2d at 85, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 31.
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The special term had dismissed the complaint for lack of personal juris-
diction over the defendant. The appellate division, in reversing the special
term's dismissal of the action, decided that a tortious act had been com-
mitted within the meaning of CPLR 302 (a) 2, and since "the statute is not
defined in terms of requiring that the cause of action arise in the State, but
only that it arise from the commission of a tortious act in the State,"81 that
such jurisdiction was proper under CPLR 302 (a)2.
On appeal, the argument of the appellate division was rejected. The
court of appeals also rejected, as it had in Longines-Wittnauer, the argument
that CPLR 302 (a)1 did not apply because the contract had been executed
in Illinois, and further discounted, as not controlling, the consideration that
the injury occurred in Connecticut. The court does, then, expand the appli-
cation of CPLR 302 (a)1 by holding, in effect, that this section will sustain
jurisdiction over a non-resident who transacts any business in the state, not
only in a cause of action arising from his transaction of that business, but
also in a cause of action that is ancillary to that business—once the necessary
nexus of contact has been shown.
Feathers v. McLucas and Singer v. Walker both presented the court
with a greater opportunity to delineate the scope of the statute than did
Longines-Wittnauer. In rejecting Gray, the court of appeals made it clear,
however, that it was determining the scope of jurisdiction granted by the
statute, and not the limitations on the statute imposed by the due process
clause. The decisions establish that the court of appeals will interpret CPLR
302 (a) 2 to require some contact with the state, in addition to the tortious
injury, in order to comprise the jurisdictional tortious act. In a case of manu-
facturer's product liability this other contact is somewhere in the limbo be-
tween no activity at all, and that "doing business" activity which would be
sufficient to bring a case within CPLR 302(a)1, as in Singer v. Walker.
IV
Although New York, in requiring some "other contact" in addition to
the tortious injury in order to sustain jurisdiction, thereby aligns itself with
the majority of states having "tortious act" statutes, the New York court is
more demanding than other courts in what it will accept as a "contact."
This unnecessarily robs the statute of its breadth of application, so that New
York does not get as much mileage out of its statute as it could.
The Vermont statute is of the "tort in whole or in part" variety, 82 and
81 Singer v. Walker, 21 App. Div. 2d 285, 286, 250 N.Y.S.2d 216, 218 (1964). The
appellate division argued that the circulation of a dangerously defective article in New
York was a tortious act occurring in the state, thus leading the way for jurisdiction on
the basis of CPLR 302(a)2—that the defendant had committed a tortious act within the
state.
82 Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 855 (1958);
If a foreign corporation makes a contract with a resident of Vermont to be
performed in whole or in part by either party in Vermont, or if such foreign
corporation commits a tort in whole or in part in Vermont against a resident of
Vermont, such acts shall be deemed to be doing business in Vermont by such
foreign corporation.
A
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was held constitutional in Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp.," a land-
mark case cited with aproval by the Supreme Court in McGee." In Smyth,
however, it was clear that the tortious injury resulted from the defendant's
transaction of business within the state.
Subsequently the Vermont court refused to sustain jurisdiction under the
same statute in O'Brien v. Comstock Foods.85 There, the plaintiff had sought
damages for injury suffered from a piece of glass discovered in canned food
packed by the defendant in New York. The court reasoned:
The vital factor in the statute is the intentional and affirmative ac-
tion on the part of the non-resident defendant in pursuit of its
corporate purposes within this jurisdiction. A single act, purposefully
performed here, will put the actor within the reach of the sovereignty
of this state, as in the Smyth case. . . [I] t is incumbent upon
the claimant to plead sufficient facts to demonstrate that the defend-
ant is causally responsible for the presence of the injuring agency
within the state of Vermont. 86
It is interesting that O'Brien and Feathers reach the same result, although
the language of the pertinent statutes is different. There is some question, as
will be pointed out below," whether the difference in statutory language
should necessarily result in different interpretations of the extent of jurisdic-
tion granted by the statute.
On the other hand, as already noted, the Supreme Court of Illinois has
sustained jurisdiction in a strikingly similar fact situation involving a "tortious
act" statute identical to CPLR 302 (a)2.88 Reasoning that the injury of the
plaintiff within the state as a result of the defendant's out-of-state negligence
is equivalent to a tortious act committed within the state," and coupling this
with the determination that the defendant should have known that there was
a large Illinois market for its product," the Illinois court sustained jurisdic-
tion.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota had less trouble than that of Vermont
in finding jurisdiction over a non-resident manufacturer where the injury was
local under its "tort in whole or in part" statute.'" In finding that an Ohio
boiler manufacurer, whose product had found its way into Minnesota where
it proved to be' defective and exploded, had sufficient contact, the court
stated: ". . . The negligent manufacture of a product in a foreign state be-
88 Supra note 37.
84 McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 n.2 (1957).
85 123 Vt. 461, 194 A.2d 568 (1963).
88 Id. at 464-65, 194 A.2d at 570-71.
87 Infra, p. 150.
88 Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d
761 (1961).
89 Id. at 435-36, 176 N.E.2d at 762-63, citing Restatement (Second), Conflict of
Laws § 377 (1958).
8° Ibid.
91
 It should be noted that the provisions of the Minnesota statute and the Vermont
statute are identically worded. Compare Minn. Stat. § 303.13(3) (1961), with Vt. Stat.
Ann. tit. 12, § 855 (1958).
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comes a tort committed 'in whole or in part in Minnesota.' '92 However, in
upholding jurisdiction under the statute, the court assumed that it was fore-
seeable by the defendant that his product would be used in Minnesota."
The commission of a tort should probably be sufficient to meet the
"minimum contact" requirement of International Shoe. Nevertheless, many
courts obviously continue to require some contact in addition to the tortious
act itself. The Vermont court probably carried this to the extreme in O'Brien
in requiring some sort of "purposeful activity" on the part of the defendant.
The "purposeful activity" test, spawned in Hanson v. Denckla, although no
doubt necessary in cases wherein the jurisdictional basis is the transaction of
business, is undoubtedly too stringent a requirement in cases where the juris-
dictional basis is a tort. Indeed, on the basis of Hess v. Pawloski and other
cases dealing with the non-resident motorist statutes, and particularly in tort
cases involving dangerous instrumentalities, there should be no need to find
any other contact. " [I] t can be noted that the continued recognition of the
nonresident motorist statutes is persuasive authority in support of the propo-
sition that the commission of a single tort within the state is sufficient to
satisfy the 'minimum contact' requirement of the International Shoe deci-
sion."94
While the Vermont court in O'Brien went to the extreme of requiring that
the defendant purposefully engage in availing himself of the Vermont market,
the Illinois court in Gray and the Minnesota court in Ehlers gave only passing
mention to this additional requirement inasmuch as these courts found that
this additional contact was satisfied with the assumption that the local market
was reasonably foreseen or contemplated by the non-resident manufacturer.
The Minnesota court has on one occasion based jurisdiction solely on
the occurrence of the tortious injury in the state—with no reliance on an
additional contact. In Atkins v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.95 the plaintiff,
a truckdriver, was injured when a steel drum containing acid broke while he
was hauling and unloading it. Although the acid was distributed by the de-
fendant, the Montanin Company, a New York corporation, on orders from
independent brokers who were not under contract, and to whom the defend-
ant paid a commission, none of the defendant's employees ever handled the
acid. Upon receipt of customer orders from the independent brokers, the
defendant had ordered the acid from a Maryland company who in turn ar-
ranged for the manufacturer, a Delaware corporation, to ship it in tank cars
92
 Ehlers v. United States Heating & Cooling Mfg. Co., 267 Minn. 56, 60, 124
N.W.2d 824, 826 (1963).
" Id. at 61, 124 N.W.2d at 827:
We feel justified, in view of the record, in concluding that the product here
involved was manufactured by appellant corporation for use by the general
public. It is not contended that the area of foreseeable use of the product was so
limited as to exclude the state of Minnesota. The affidavit filed ... did not negate
the reasonable inference that the "Fireball" boiler is a mass-production unit
intended for nationwide use.
94
 Jenner & Tone, Historical & Practice Notes to the Illinois Statutes (Smith-Hurd
Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 110, § 17 (1956)) 165, 169, included by the New York Advisory Com-
mittee in its report, supra note 71, at 471, 475.
09
 258 Minn. 571, 104 N.W.2d 888 (1960),
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to Robinson Brothers Chemicals in New York. Robinson Brothers then re-
packed the acid in five gallon drums which they had purchased from Jones &
Laughlin, the manufacturer, which had tested the drums at its plant in Penn-
sylvania. Robinson Brothers then arranged for the shipment of the acid filled
drums to the defendant's customers by independent trucker, by whom the
plaintiff was employed.
Jurisdiction over the defendant was held to be proper under the Minne-
sota statute. The Minnesota court quoted with approval the memorandum of
the lower court:
"Without doubt the principal act of negligence occurred in the mak-
ing and sealing of the container; that occurred in an eastern state.
However, a mere failure to exercise reasonable care is not a tort.
It only becomes a tort actionable as such when someone is injured
as a proximate result. . .. Damage is an essential element of the
cause of action. . . In this case the leakage of the dangerous sub-
stance occurred in Minnesota, and the plaintiff was injured thereby
in this state. It is the opinion of the Court that the tort occurred
therefore in part in Minnesota." 96
In affirming jurisdiction, the Minnesota Supreme Court, using the ordi-
nary product liability theory, held that the defendant was liable to anyone
that his product injures despite the lack of privity of contract. The court
found the exercise of jurisdiction proper without a finding of or even an allu-
sion to any other contact.
[I] f the allegations of the complaint herein are established, it would
follow that defendant was subject to the jurisdiction of our courts,
since the last event essential to its tort liability—the injury of plain-
tiff—occurred here. Under § 303.13, subd. 1(3), such contact with
a Minnesota resident constituted doing business here so as to make
defendant subject to service of process as provided therein. 97
The New York Court of Appeals' test for determining the applicability
of CPLR 302 (a)2 lies somewhere in the middle of the spectrum of these
various state approaches. The court of appeals' opinion makes it clear that
the New York courts require more "contact" occurrence of a tortious injury,
thus clearly looking for a broader base of jurisdiction than did the Minnesota
court in Atkins. Although it seems that New York will not require as stringent
a standard as did Vermont in O'Brien—that is, that the defendant "purpose-
fully act" so as to avail himself of the local market for his product—it is also
clear that New York will not be satisfied, as were the Gray and Ehlers courts,
with a mere assumption that the local market was known, or foreseeable to the
defendant. Indeed, the court of appeals refused to make this assumption
when invited to do so by the plaintiff in Feathers v. McLucas." Into the small
area left, the court engrafts its interpretation of the basis of jurisdiction under
06 Id. at 575-76, 104 N.W.2d at 891.
97 Id. at 579, 104 N.W.2d at 893.
98 Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., supra note 61, at 464,
209 N.E.2d at 79, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 24.
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CPLR 302 (a) 2. If the defendant is purposefully engaging in the New York
market, he is clearly "transacting business" in the state and jurisdiction can
be based, even in a cause of action arising out of a tort, on CPLR 302 (a)1---
as was done in Singer v. Walker. Yet the court is unwilling to base jurisdiction
under section 2 of CPLR 302 (a) on a tortious injury alone! By its unwilling-
,ness to assume that the New York market was reasonably foreseeable to the
defendant, the court limits jurisdiction under CPLR 302 (a)2 to the very
few cases in which there is a tortious act within the state and the plaintiff
can also show some additional contact—not necessarily so much as to con-
stitute a "transaction of business" but enough so that the court will not have
to assume that "other contact."
Chief Judge Desmond, in his dissent, hinted that he might be willing to
adopt a more liberal view. The Chief Judge concurred with the result of
Singer v. Walker, but argued that jurisdiction could have been sustained
under section 2 as well as section 1 of CPLR 302(a); for that reason also, he
would have affirmed Feathers v. McLucas. All the single-tort-act statutes, he
says, "reflect the idea that the various separate acts or omissions may together
make out a tort. For instance, the totality of an actionable tort such as
charged here (involving manufacturer's products liability) consists of three
elements: defective manufacture, distribution to purchaser, and a resulting
injury."" The suggestion then, is that any one of these tortious acts (which
together comprise a tort) should be sufficient, if it occurs in New York, to
meet the statutory requirement of the commission of a "tortious act within
the state."
Desmond strengthens this intimation with the suggestion that the seman-
tic differences among the various state statutes are of no consequence, and
that these should not be interpreted as indicating different legislative intents
concerning the scope of conferred jurisdiction. The New York statute, he
suggests,"° which calls for the commission of a "tortious act," is no different
in content or intent from the Minnesota or Vermont statutes which call for
the commission of a "tort in whole or in part" or from the Connecticut or
North Carolina statutes which call for "tortious conduct. ”101 Since, as he
points out, an actionable tort is composed of several "tortious acts," all these
statutes through their various wordings are in actuality demanding the same
conduct as a basis for the exercise of jurisdiction.
. However, after appearing to advocate the position that the tortious injury
alone should be sufficient under the statute, Desmond retreats, and urges
upon the court the rationale of Gray: that the tortious injury within the state
plus the contemplated or reasonably anticipated market within the state for
the non-resident manufacturer's product is equivalent to a tortious act within
the purview of any of the statutes.'°2
99
 Id. at 470-71, 209 N.E.2d at 84, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 30.
100
 Id. at 470, 209 N.E.2d at 84, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 29-30.
101
 Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 33-411(c) (1960); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-145(a) (4)
(1965).
102 Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., supra note 61, at 471,
209 N.E.2d at 84, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 30: ". . . Millen a manufacturer purposefully sends its
product into the forum state or when his conduct of his business is such that he contem-
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It would seem that the assumption that the defendant could reasonably
have foreseen that his product would find use in New York could have com-
fortably been made by the court of appeals in these cases, particularly since
all the defendants sent their products into a widespread market. And it also
appears that New York case law would amply support the view that the dis-
tribution of a dangerous instrumentality, made dangerous by negligent manu-
facture, or an injury due to such distribution is a tortious act—as suggested
by Desmond. Such a step would have been expected from the court that has
been such a forerunner in the field of manufacturer's warranty.'"
V
Whenever a statute, or any other basis•of state jurisdiction is at issue,
the consideration must ever be present that in a mobile economy such as ours,
it is necessary to provide a forum that will be convenient for the plaintiff as
well as for the defendant.'" Not only is there the question of how many
witnesses each party would have to bring a long distance in order to testify
at the trial, but, in the interests of fairness, the courts must also consider the
type of business that the nonresident defendant has engaged in. If the de-
fendant is engaged in a local business, catering to the needs of his local com-
munity, and doing nothing to garner a more widespread trade, then it would
seem undue to force him to come a long distance to defend an action arising
from a defect in his product when he never contemplated or even planned or
desired that his product would ever find its way into the forum state. But the
defendants in both Feathers v. McLucas and Singer v. Walker were engaged
in a widespread business. Estwing solicited business in other states; Darby
sold its product to a customer in another state, and could not help but be
aware of the fact that its Product would ultimately be used in many states.
Thus, by engaging in a more widely ranged business activity it does not seem
undue that these manufacturers be compelled to go to wherever the market
plates the delivery of his product in a forum state he is guilty of a tortious act in the
forum state if the product is defective in such manner that the manufacturer is liable in
tort."
108 See cases cited by Judge Van Voorhis, id. at 468-69, 209 N.E.2d 82-83, 261
N.Y.S.2d at 28.
104 Mr. Justice Black recognized the importance of this factor in McGee v. Interna-
tional Life Ins. Co., supra note 84, at 223-24:
It cannot be denied that California has a manifest interest in providing effective
means of redress for its residents when their insurers refuse to pay claims. These
residents would be at a severe disadvantage if they were forced to follow the
insurance company to a distant State in order to hold it legally accountable.
When claims were small or moderate individual claimants frequently could not
afford the cost of bringing an action in a foreign forum—thus in effect making the
company judgement proof. Often the crucial witnesses—as here on the company's
defense of suicide—will be found in the insured's locality. Of course there may be
inconvenience to the insurer if it is held amenable to suit in California where it
had this contract but certainly nothing which amounts to a denial of due
process.
On the other hand, it was noted in Hanson v. Denckla, 238 U.S. 235, 254 (1958), that
relative convenience to the parties should never become a substitute for personal
jurisdiction.
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into which they willingly entered may carry their product in order to defend
suits resulting from the defects in the products which they placed in that
market. The engagement in such a widespread market may by itself go a long
way toward meeting the foreseeability test. Indeed, it could be argued that
when courts like those in Gray and Ehlers are so ready to make the assump-
tion that the defendant had contemplated or could have foreseen that its prod-
uct would enter the forum market, they are in fact simply balancing the
equities between plaintiff and defendant in the light of the market for the
latter's product.
CPLR 302 (a) represents the interest of the state in providing a con-
venient forum for its citizens who are injured at the hands of those who enter
the state, or use its facilities. No stronger case can be pointed out to demon-
strate this interest and the need for this protection than Feathers v. McLucas.
The state has no effective means of controlling the worthiness of the carriers
of interstate commerce, and cannot restrict the use of the state roads in cases
of interstate shipment of dangerous cargos in defective containers. Therefore,
the state should be able to provide a convenient forum for its citizens injured
through the out-of-state negligence of a manufacturer who allows a defective
(and dangerous) product to go into or through New York.
But the decision of the court of appeals restricts the scope of interpreta-
tion of the statute so narrowly that for all practical purposes CPLR 302(a)2,
standing alone, in cases of manufacturer's tort liability, cannot provide a
basis of jurisdiction. By failing to read into the statute a more desirable range
of jurisdiction, the court of appeals likely misconstrued the intent of the
legislature, and failed to meet the needs of the people of New York. Chief
Judge Desmond recognized this inadequacy in the court of appeals' inter-
pretation:
The damage being done by this decision is not to the plain-
tiff and his cause but to the second part of section 302 (suhd. a,
par. 2: "commits a tortious act within the state") which is being
given a restrictive meaning not required or justified, contrary to the
plain language of the statute itself and its evident purpose and to
the relevant decisions in this court and in courts of other states.'° 5
MICHAEL L. GOLDBERG
105
 Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., supra note 61, at 470,
209 N.E,2d at 84, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 29.
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